resources "squeezed" from agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s have laid the foundation for Taiwan's economic expansion and industrial development.
Adverse effects of heavy taxation on agriculture began to show up in the 1960s, as the nonfarm sector accelerated its growth and overtook agriculture in both NDP and total exports. By the early 1970s, Taiwan's agricultural policy was due for a change. This was in part because of concern for food security as Taiwan's rice production fell to a 10-year low amid a worldwide grain shortage, and in part because of the demand for legitimacy as Chiang Ching-kuo, the oldest son of Chiang Kai-shek, was preparing to take over.
As shown in the Program for Accelerating Rural Development (1972) and the Statute of Agricultural Development (1973) , those policies and programs that were most detrimental to farmers were abolished. Agricultural policy was reoriented from taxation to protection and subsidization. The Rice-for-Fertilizer program was replaced by a Food Stabilization Fund (1974) , which, in its first three years, purchased rice at 20% above production cost. Furthermore, guaranteed prices for domestic production and such protective measures as import licensing and restrictions were adopted to support the agricultural sector.
However, since the mid-1980s, these state intervention and support programs have faced increasing challenges. The first wave of pressures came from the U.S. government, which asked Taiwan to lower tariff and nontariff barriers for agriculture and services both to fulfill the latter's obligations under the 1978 U.S.-Taiwan Trade Agreement and, more importantly, to reduce its trade surplus. Topics such as Taiwan's rice subsidy and exports as well as trade barriers for wine, cigarettes, fruit, beef, and turkeys have been high-priority issues on the U.S. agenda throughout the 1980s. Persistent efforts and pressures from the U.S. gradually decreased tariff rates and import controls on many items; as a result, Taiwan's agricultural imports more than doubled by the end of the 1980s.2 Liberalization pressures and the influx of imports have definitely had an impact on Taiwan's farmers.
In an attempt to seek extended international recognition and counterbalance U.S. trade pressures through a multilateral framework, Taiwan in 1990 applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Once again the agricultural sector became a focal point, this time in the accession negotiations.
Such issues as market access, production subsidies, and other agricultural programs have come under close scrutiny from member states. For example, the U.S. put forth a list of 8,000 items for tariff reduction and demanded that average agricultural duties be kept below 20%. These requests became an Consequently, to avoid unnecessary delays and foot-dragging in trade negotiations with the U.S., the modus vivendi in the Task Force has since been to see all issues on the agenda as a total package and rank them in implicit priority so that some might be sacrificed to protect others. The patterns indicated that the Taiwanese government favored tariff concessions to market openings, and the service sectors over agriculture.10 Since then, the COA has faced greater internal pressures from MOEA and MOFA; both preferred to maintain an amicable relationship with the U.S., Taiwan's largest export market and its most important political supporter.
For economic and diplomatic officials, making concessions on agricultural issues was simply to follow the path of least resistance. The political risk was considered limited, given the traditional obedience and acquiescence of farmers and their groups; also, the adjustments were less disruptive given the diminishing role of agriculture in Taiwan's economy. In the early 1980s, Taiwan's agricultural sector grew at a meager 2%, in contrast with a near 5% growth in the 1970s. Agriculture accounted for less than 10% of the GDP and less than 19% of total employment (compared to 30% and 51%, respectively, in the early 1960s). Only 9% of the farming population remained fulltime, with part-time farming households soaring to a record-level of 91%.
For the efficiency-oriented, cost-conscious economic officials in the Task Force, reducing the level of agricultural protectionism was a logical step.
In response to pressure from the U.S., Taiwan reduced tariffs for over 100 agricultural products between 1985 and 1987 and eliminated many import restrictions; most concessions were made in the areas of fruit (fresh or canned) and meat (beef, fish, and turkey). Incidentally, as the Taiwanese economy continued to grow and personal incomes continued to rise, people reduced their consumption of rice while spending more money on more expensive products such as meats, vegetables, and fruits. Trade liberalization in these areas thus gave foreign competitors a golden opportunity to push into Taiwan's market. The enormous surge in agricultural imports quickly led to price meltdown, causing many local farmers to suffer greatly as a result.
Farmers' Protests and Subsequent Developments
Even though subsidy and support programs in the early 1970s had given farmers a much needed breather, they failed to change the fundamentals.
Critics pointed out that just 3% of total public investment went to agriculture in the late 1980s, although the sector accounted for 5% of the GNP at the The farmers' second problem was that their weakness in creating political organizations was aggravated further by internal division, a result of economic diversification in the farming profession. In the 1960s, rice was the dominant crop in Taiwan, accounting for 40% of the agricultural production value. Since then, its economic significance has diminished substantially.
By the late 1980s, lice (17%) trailed well behind the fastest growing sectors, livestock (40%) and fruit/vegetables (28%), in the share of production value.'5 As a consequence, Taiwan's farmers had come to comprise two subgroups: traditional rice farmers and emerging fruit and livestock farmers.
Though rice farmers accounted for the majority of farmers in Taiwan, most were engaged in agriculture only part-time. Generally, they were older, under-educated, and politically passive and conservative. Fruit and livestock farmers, on the other hand, were younger, better educated, and closer to the image of capitalist entrepreneurs than that of being provincial farmers. They were more informed about the market and were quite sensitive to price fluctuations because of the significant amount of investment and risk involved in their farming operations. Although they constituted a smaller share of farming households, they were politically active and very vocal about their grievances. In fact, they initiated and participated in most of the protests and demonstrations of the 1980s.
The two groups shared in both their discontent with government agricultural policies and the desire to improve their economic fortunes. However, they had different attitudes toward farming and farmland policy. Rice farmers, who saw rice farming as unprofitable but realized that the land they owned might be worth a fortune if sold for commercial or industrial use, wanted to leave farming altogether. They insisted that the government ease restrictions on farmland transactions. But fruit farmers, who grew tropical and subtropical fruit along mountain slopes, and livestock farmers, who invested large amounts of money in building hog or chicken farms, were interested in creating a more favorable "business" environment. The differences in their concerns and approaches led to an internal division in the farmers'
protests. 
org/terms
The legacy of the farmers' traditional political culture probably made one choice more obvious and attractive than the other, but it also limited the breadth and depth of their political influence.
As discussed below, the government subsequently responded to farmers with small favors of various forms but conceded nothing on fundamental issues. The decisions to join GATT/WTO, the pursuit of the IAAP, and the plan to scale down agricultural employment to 3% in 10 years by moving an estimated 700,000 or 800,000 farmers out of the farming sector,'6 indicated that the government was determined to pursue agricultural retrenchment, or a de-farming policy. Contrary to farmers' wishes, moral obligation gave way to principles of economic efficiency and cost effectiveness. Agriculture's ancillary position in the economy was cemented despite the protests.
Domestic Bargaining after 1988
The farmers' demonstrations did change the government's position of "interventionist negligence," at least for the short run. The anger and frustration displayed made it impossible for the state to implement further retrenchment simply by decree; hence, a repertory of tactics was used to appease farmers while allowing the government to continue its de-farming practices.
Side-payments
First, to ease the tension, the government resorted to the tactic of making side-payments. As a form of direct or indirect compensation, the side-payment is often explained as being a measure to alleviate grievances. Several measures that could be conceived as side-payments were adopted shortly after the farmers' protests; some were in answer to the seven propositions made However, despite these programs, it is clear that the "generosity" of the Executive Yuan had its limits. Not all projects earned its blessing. For instance, the crop insurance programs and direct payments intended to provide additional benefits to farmers that were proposed by the COA in 1991 stalled in the Executive Yuan due to their potential costs. It appeared that the government was trying to placate farmers with minimal, selective concessions.
This strategy can be seen most clearly in the policy making process surrounding the monthly stipend for the elderly farmers. The idea was first proposed as a retirement stipend for farmers in 1990 and a task force was formed to study the issue. But in the next three years, it met only twice. In October 1993, months after another symbolic rally by farmers commemorating the fifth anniversary of the 1988 demonstration, both President Lee Teng Hui and Premier Lien Chen indicated that the administration would propose legislation by the end of the year. However, the deadline came and went. In August 1994, the government announced that, due to the potential cost and burden on the budget, it would have to abandon the idea. The use of these side-payments evidently represented the Executive
Yuan's response to the farmers' call for the government to fulfill its moral obligations. However, to project a loving and caring image through monetary compensations puts an extra burden on the government budget. Therefore, in an attempt to minimize these financial burdens while maintaining its responsive image, the Taiwan government explored another less expensive optionpursuing ideas with an appearance of integrative arrangement.
Integrative Arrangement
The idea behind integrative arrangement is to integrate opposing needs and demands by creating innovative agreements that can satisfy both sides. As a means of obtaining joint benefits from divergent positions, integrative arrangements attempt to bridge differences and promote common interests for everyone involved. In the case of Taiwan, some agricultural policies might, on the surface, appear to benefit both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors;
however, close analysis shows the distribution of benefits to be either limited for, or skewed against, farmers.
Farmland release. After the land reform, severe restrictions were put on farmland transactions. Farmland must be transferred between farmers and used for agricultural purposes; it cannot be diverted to other uses. As of 1995, farmland accounted for 24.3% of the total land in Taiwan; that zoned for industrial, commercial, and residential use occupied only 7.6% in total.
The farmland share is much higher than that of many other Asian economies such as Hong Kong (15%), Malaysia (14.9%), and Indonesia (17% To circumvent the ban, it was reported that many financial interests had already obtained deeds to valuable farmland close to urban areas by taking advantage of existing legal loopholes. After establishing control, they pushed for rezoning and converted the land to nonfarm use, which resulted in huge profits. Farmers who sold land became rich overnight. Such stories have encouraged many farmers to believe that they are sitting on gold mines and so they are more than willing to cash in on their fortunes by selling the land.
As a consequence, a push for change in the laws governing sales of farmland was made a top priority in the farmers' movements in 1988, especially for rice farmers.
After much deliberation and debate, on July 27, 1995, the Executive Yuan approved the Farmland Release Program to ease restrictions on farmland rezoning. Under this program, a total of 160,000 hectares of land that was polluted, low-producing, or in coastal subsidence areas was targeted for release to nonfarm use. By lifting or easing the restrictions, the government sought not only to appease farmers but to serve industrial and commercial interests as well. Although this was seen as a farmer's dream come true, it is doubtful that many will benefit from it. The high land prices were originally caused by tight control of supply. By lifting the controls, the increased supply of land might actually depress land values and potential profits for farmers. In addition, the proposed windfall tax on huge profits, allegedly designed to cut down potential profits for big financial groups, could also take away capital gains from ordinary farmers.
The measure's real beneficiary could be commercial or industrial interests, who can obtain land at much lower prices. Builders and developers are less interested in farmlands released from the program since they are generally far from other living or commercial facilities; their prime targets are the quality farmland at the periphery of the cities. Consequently, they continue to push for total release and free transaction of all farmland. If they succeed, it could lead to further de-farming of Taiwan.
Farmer migration. To effectively reduce the number of farmers in Taiwan, the COA in the early 1990s proposed encouraging farmers to emigrate to other countries. At various times, the destinations proposed included the former Soviet Union, mainland China, and other Southeast Asian countries.
Modeling its earlier strategy on the "agricultural diplomacy" that sent techni- Ironically, there were also unexpected policy backlashes when farmers invested in mainland China, a place with similar language and cultural backgrounds. Fujian Province has attracted over US$1 billion in agricultural investments from Taiwan in the areas of vegetables, black mushrooms, and fruit. Farmers on the mainland quickly learned and copied the agricultural know-how offered by Taiwanese farmers and easily moved into cutthroat competition with Taiwanese investors in both the mainland and overseas markets. Additionally, the commodities put more pressure on Taiwanese farmers when exported to Taiwan, given the cost advantages on the mainland.
Nevertheless, from another perspective, it could be argued that by using the opportunity to import agricultural products from mainland China, the Taiwanese government could accomplish several goals at once. First, it would expedite de-farming by pushing "inefficient" farmers out of the m through competition. However, since many agricultural products from China were banned officially in Taiwan and smuggled in, it is the smugglers, not the government, on whom the blame would fall. On the other hand, cheap imports from the mainland could ease inflationary pressure as Taiwan reduces its farms and farmlands. The soundness of the de-famling policy will not be challenged seriously so long as consumers do not feel the pain of rising prices or food shortages.
Recreational agriculture. To preserve the farmers' livelihood and the farm- pick-your-own farms are now in the vicinity of Taipei City.
However, critics argue that such models might not be feasible for everyone.19 To make a farm attractive enough for recreational agriculture, seasonal fruits must be grown year-round; this requires a large-scale operation and huge start-up capital. Otherwise, small-size farms can generate only limited profits. At most, agri-tourism can only be used as a sideline business; it is definitely not a practical solution to the fundamental problems in agriculture.
Conclusion
In Taiwan, the lifting of agricultural protectionism was forced upon the country by external pressures from foreign governments at a time of internal democratization. Cross-cutting pressures from within and without presented a dilemma for the government and limited its ability to maneuver. Domestically, the government ran into stiff resistance as farmers organized massive demonstrations in an attempt to keep their markets protected and subsidies intact.
However, the farmers' protests had problems. Weaknesses in organization and lobbying, conservative attitudes, and internal divisions all failed to sustain the momentum in their movements. Most importantly, by taking advantage of some of these problems, the Taiwanese government skillfully used side-payments and proposed integrative arrangements to defuse the pressure.
In the end, very few concessions were made, while the government moved closer to its goal of retrenchment and de-farming. It might have been inevitable to see a shrinking and diminishing of the agricultural sector's role in a fast-growing industrial and service-based economy, but the course taken to get there politically was not a straight one.
19. Kelly Her, "Agricultural Amateurs," Free China Review 47:10 (October 1997), p. 31.
